Showing posts with label Hugo Chavez. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Hugo Chavez. Show all posts

Thursday, June 28, 2007

Nationalism and oil deals

From the Economist comes this article which provides an overview of the deals struck between oil companies and nationalistic regimes around the world.

It says that "
despite all this huffing and puffing there is no consensus on what constitutes a good deal from the energy-rich state's viewpoint; and countries with the fiercest rhetoric do not always succeed in driving the hardest bargains."

This is an insightful piece worth a read.

-------------------------------

Barking louder, biting less
Mar 8th 2007, From The Economist print edition

NEO-COLONIALISM, crude exploitation, plunder, blood-money: no term is too inflammatory, it seems, for critics of Iraq's proposed oil law. If passed in its current form, it will allow Iraq's weak, American-backed government to flog the national patrimony on the cheap, by signing unduly generous contracts with foreign oil firms. At least so the argument goes, especially among radical types who are inclined to write off America's whole strategy in the region as one of mercantilism backed by bombs.

In a similar spirit of stridency, Venezuela is now insisting on renegotiating the few remaining contracts with Western oil firms that it has not already overhauled. In Russia, meanwhile, an increasingly abrasive President Vladimir Putin is making it clear that in future foreign oilmen will not receive as warm a welcome as they did in the 1990s. All around the world, from Algeria to China, governments are changing the terms of investment in oil and gas, on the ground that they are not receiving their fair share of the profits. For critics of capitalism, last year's surge in oil and gas prices seemed to present a long-awaited chance to shift the global balance of power away from corporate behemoths and the governments that are closest to them.

But despite all this huffing and puffing there is no consensus on what constitutes a good deal from the energy-rich state's viewpoint; and countries with the fiercest rhetoric do not always succeed in driving the hardest bargains. The proportion of oil revenue that goes to governments can vary from as much as 90% to as little as 10%, according to Saad Rahim of PFC Energy, a consultancy. And there are many reasons—quite apart from differing levels of nationalist self-assertion—why the picture should be so mixed. Some countries have small or relatively inaccessible reserves, or no known reserves at all, and so have to offer favourable terms to entice foreigners' interest. Other states might seem like risky places to do business of any kind (thanks in some instances to past nationalisations of the oil industry) and must therefore offer preferential terms to woo investors. Others agree to sacrifice some of their take for the sake of creating extra jobs or diversifying the economy.

Governments (including those of rich countries, even the United States) often end up with a reduced share of oil revenue for less edifying reasons, such as sheer incompetence. By their own admission, American civil servants accidentally left a critical clause out of contracts signed in 1998 and 1999 with oil firms drilling in federal waters, doing taxpayers out of as much as $14 billion. The same officials are now warning Congress that its efforts to recoup the money might cost the government even more, in the form of expensive lawsuits and delays to future payments. Poor countries, with underfunded and corrupt bureaucracies, often have an even harder time keeping oil firms in line.

A common mistake made by energy-rich states is entering short-sighted contracts that take no account of possible changes in the oil price. Venezuela signed the deals it now wants to repudiate in the 1990s, when oil fetched as little as $10 a barrel. At that price, the arduous process of extracting something useful from the country's plentiful deposits of tar-like “heavy oil” was barely profitable. So the government offered to lower the income-tax rate for such projects and levy royalties of just 1%. As the oil price soared over the past few years, those enticements began to seem impossibly munificent.

Russia is another place where circumstances have changed. It was broke and desperate to attract investment in 1994, when it signed a contract with a consortium led by Royal Dutch Shell to develop oil and gas reserves off its Pacific coast. To persuade the investors to take on such a tricky job in a country with such parlous politics, the government agreed to forgo its share of the revenues until they had recouped their costs. But it did not foresee the long delays and near-doubling of projected costs that have afflicted the scheme and pushed back its payday.

Most oil-rich countries are trying to move away from such rigid regimes. But there is little consensus about what should replace them. Many governments are signing contracts with variable terms, so that as the oil price rises, either tax rates rise with it, as happens in Malaysia, or the state-owned oil company's share of production increases, as in Azerbaijan.

Some countries, including Angola, have gone as far as specifying a fixed rate of return on investments, beyond which almost all profits go to the government. But such deals lead inevitably to rows about what counts as a legitimate expense on which a profit should be earned. Angola's contracts for offshore production are structured in such a way that firms actually make more money if projects exceed their budgets—a set-up that can lead to gold-plated cutlery in the staff canteen, according to Graham Kellas of Wood Mackenzie, a research firm. Iran, in contrast, forces foreign contractors to bear almost all the expense of cost overruns—a massive risk for oil firms given the current run-up in the price of both materials and labour throughout the industry.

Nationalist rhetoric often clouds the substance of the issue. After all, Qatar, which has welcomed big Western oil firms with open arms, has managed to secure a greater share of the revenue from its oil and gas than any country in South America, despite all the tub-thumping talk of ending foreign exploitation. Even after Ecuador introduced a windfall profit tax on oil firms last year, it still offers investors bigger profits on each barrel they pump than Alaska, America's biggest oil province, according to Wood Mackenzie's calculations. Recent tax changes in Britain cost oil firms more money than similar measures in Venezuela. In terms of the percentage of future profits gobbled up, Britain's taxmen have been even greedier than Russia's (see chart).

Self-proclaimed “resource nationalists” do not even agree on what the phrase means. Iraqi firebrands insist that any arrangement that gives foreign oil firms a formal claim on any of their country's oil or gas is an unpardonable affront to national sovereignty. Meanwhile Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez is forcing foreign oil firms to migrate to contracts that do just that. The issue is not as arcane as it sounds: foreign oil firms are often willing to pay handsomely not just for the right to pump oil, but also for notional ownership of it, which makes a big difference to their accounts, in America in particular.

Nationalists also tend to encourage state-owned firms to take an ever-larger role in the oil industry, both as a matter of national pride and to build local expertise. But setting up a state-owned oil firm is a big expense in itself. They are rarely as efficient or capable as their private partners, and often run expropriated assets into the ground. After Rosneft, a Russian state-owned oil giant, took over some oilfields from Yukos, a private rival, their output actually fell, although it is now rising again. The Russian state may have reasserted its control over the oil industry, but production, and government revenues, are almost certainly lower than they would have been with greater private investment.

Raising taxes, which Russia has also done, is a simpler and often more effective method of maximising the government's take. Norway, for example, levies a swingeing 78% tax on oil firms' profits. By contrast, its state-owned oil firm, Statoil, manages to recoup only a further 6-7% of the industry's profits by actively investing in wells and rigs.

Perhaps the most elegant option for governments is to ask investors what share of the revenue from any given field they would be willing to surrender, and award production rights to the one that makes the highest offer. In 2005 Libya held such an auction, in which foreign investors agreed to hand over more than 90% of any oil they found in ten of the 23 areas up for grabs.

As those figures suggest, even oil firms themselves are coming round to the idea that the most profitable contracts are not always the best, since revanchist governments are likely to renege on any deal that seems too onerous in hindsight. Many big projects have prospective lifetimes of 20 years or more, and financing arrangements built around such expectations. In such cases, a stingy but predictable regime might be preferable to a lucrative one that suffers from frequent or dramatic revisions. By that measure, the worst place to produce oil is not Russia or Venezuela, according to Mr Rahim, but Britain, which is constantly tinkering with its tax rates.

Saturday, June 09, 2007

Criticism from away . . . Or calling it like it is

VOCM has already framed this story through their headline National Paper Aims at Premier and their lede that a mainland paper has "taken another swipe at Danny Williams." But numbers like employment rate are hard, cold and indisputable although their interpretation might be called into question.

Still, not all numbers are politics; some are just numbers whether you like them or not.

Judge for yourself.

And if you want to see the raw numbers on which this article is based, check StatsCan here and scroll down to the tables.

---------------------------------------------------------------
Danny Chavez makes life harder on the Rock

Derek DeCloet
Globe and Mail, June 9, 2007

Nothing can stop Canada's sizzling job market, and it's not just an Alberta story any more. In every province but two, unemployment is lower today than in 2000, and in absolute terms, no province has enjoyed a bigger decline in the jobless rate than Newfoundland and Labrador.

Yes, this week's employment data prove it: As Premier of the Rock, Danny Williams is an economic disaster. No, really. He is. The drop in Newfoundland's unemployment rate to 12.9 per cent sounds good - it was nearly 17 per cent at the start of the decade - but the statistic hides as much as it tells. It flatters Mr. Williams.

A more meaningful figure is the employment rate, which tells you what percentage of the labour pool is actually working (as opposed to the number who are looking for work but can't find it). The hard facts are these: barely half - 51.5 per cent - of working-age Newfoundlanders have a job, trailing everywhere else by a country mile. Forget Alberta. If only Newfoundland had the same employment rate as tiny Prince Edward Island (61 per cent), it would have 40,000 more inhabitants drawing a paycheque.

How can this be, in a province blessed with abundant oil reserves, during the greatest energy boom in a generation? I doubt that Newfoundlanders are that much lazier than other Canadians. It's about opportunity, or lack of it. Newfoundland's jobs boom is a mirage: Roughly the same number of jobs exist there today as in October, 2003, when Mr. Williams was elected. It's the size of the labour force that has shrunk, because residents are moving to Fort McMurray and other points west.

"If [companies] want to deal with South American dictators, they can go to South America," says Charles Cirtwill, acting president of the Atlantic Institute for Market Studies in Halifax. He's referring, of course, to Mr. Williams' latest gambit - to demand a 5-per-cent stake in all future oil and gas projects, at no cost to the province. A similar demand has put the brakes on Hebron, a massive offshore oil development led by Exxon Mobil and Chevron.

If that smells vaguely like expropriation, or perhaps extortion, we assure you that it's merely Mr. Williams trying to get a "fair share," to use the phrase that often accompanies Newfoundlanders' grievances. Fairness is in the eye of the beholder, though. Wade Locke, an economist at Memorial University, found that government's take of offshore oil projects is 51 to 55 per cent of pretax cash flow - "similar to the shares found in Alaska, Alberta and Australia." The province gets a larger piece than Ottawa.

So lush are the royalties from energy that they could turn Newfoundland into a "have" province by about 2012, ending decades of equalization payments from the feds, Mr. Locke writes. Inconveniently, that would also bring an end to Mr. Williams' popular stunts to protest that multibillion-dollar gifts of equalization are not enough. Politically, that's magic. Mr. Williams' Conservatives enjoy more than 70 per cent approval in recent polls.

But if extreme confrontation works for squeezing more dough out of Ottawa, it doesn't work for business. When it comes to the Premier's tiresome Danny Chavez routine, oil companies don't know where the demands will stop. In Hebron, the government first demanded a 4.9-per-cent stake. Mr. Williams' Natural Resources Minister is already warning that it will ask for more, once negotiations resume. "If you're an investor, you're not interested in finding a resource that may be nationalized four or five years from now," says Mr. Cirtwill of AIMS.

Don't laugh. That's essentially what happened to Fishery Products International. The province didn't reclaim ownership of FPI, but successive Liberal and Tory governments neutered the company. Twice since 2001, the province amended the FPI Act, obstructing a merger attempt and meddling in restructuring plans. John Risley, who was part of the investor group that took control of the company in 2001, remembers getting a phone call from FPI's lead banker. "He said, 'You guys don't run this business any more. The government does.' "

FPI is being sold now in pieces - only after the province imposed conditions that will force the buyers to prop up rural towns in Newfoundland. Mr. Risley says breaking up the company was the only way to get it out from under the government's thumb. The quickest way to fix the poisoned business environment would be for voters to kick Mr. Williams out this fall, but Mr. Cirtwill just laughs at the idea. "The only real question is, is he going to win every seat?"